In this moment there is one thing reminding us Milošević`s times – again there is the same unanswered question – how long this endless political degradation will keep going? We can hardly talk about any long lasting strategy which would lead the country to some defined point. The only issue about which there is a certain consensus in Serbian politics is the direction towards EU. The differences in opinions are only about the tempo. Although the concept of the EU here is still more an abstract idea than a real state that could be achieved in a reasonable time, it still provides the highest political capital as around 60% of inhabitants support the integration. So even if we are far from final destination at least there is less and less chance to return back from the EU line.
NATO – why NOT?
NATO was an aggressor 12 years ago in Serbia, breaking the rules of international law, starting the bombing without the approval of UN Safety Council. It was the second major combat in its history after the Bosnian operation in 1995. It is easy to see the reason why the Serbian society has an explicit anti NATO attitude. It is also true that even after the 500 years of Turkish occupation, it is possible to make business with Turkey and welcome their capital in Serbia today. Well, then why would it be different with NATO? The only question is the time. What is necessary, it is to look at this action from a definite time distance. As the Serbian society let the chance pass, to face and accept the fact that Milošević's policy was wrong, the North-Atlantic Alliance still enjoys the reputation of an enemy. Even if already some political actors supports a closer cooperation with Partnership for Peace or requests directly the accession to NATO, according to Professor Tibor Várady - it would be a political suicide to declare open pro - NATO policy in Serbia today. After all there are two political parties: the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) that openly support the NATO accession. Both of them have only marginal position in the Parliament. One of the most respected representatives of the pro NATO approach is however the Defense Minister, Dragan Šutanovac, who has just recently announced that NATO strategic conference will be held in Belgrade in the summer. Observing the reactions and comments on different news portals this event is rather considered by the public opinion as a provocation than an opportunity to fall into one line with developed countries. Simply the Serbian society cannot accept such a big turn in a relatively short time. As I mentioned for a majority of population the NATO today is rather an enemy than a future partner to follow.
Obviously as it was emphasized by Professor Várady the biggest mistake was leaving Kosovo to Milošević under the UN’s resolution. This virtual political construction became the heaviest ballast for Serbia after the war, making major impact on the process of democratization. The Kosovo issue became the biggest trouble for all the upcoming democratic governments after Milošević's removal. This status quo became a cheap fuel for national populist parties and for all those political opportunist without any concrete programs. In this environment any evaluation of the mistakes and consequences of the previous decade’s policy became impossible, as all the time the territorial integrity was threatened. Therefore any liberal approach is considered as not patriotic. Creating an “artificial” fear of the national territory loss offered enough political capital to spin the Serbian public opinion and to win elections.
Nataša Nikolić, a young lawyer, states that the anti NATO atmosphere is rather a result of the lack of information about the real benefits of an eventual accession while of course there is a space for traditional defiance as well. She thinks that while the NATO accession issue might be so problematic because of incapacity of the political elite to make strategic decisions it is also possible that politicians want to use it later as an argument in some important international political deals. She also points out to the few controversial sentences of the Haag Tribunal delivering very strict punishments for Serbian defendants while it not always was so strict in case of non Serbians. It has resulted in serious doubts in institutions under the wing of NATO and generally the Western states.
Definitely there are structures with a strong interest to keep the military monopoly within the borders. The secret services due to a lack of lustration after the revolution in 2000 kept their structure and position utilizing the political instability to grow out as a political factor out of the control of state administration. Their power is very well indicated by the murder of the Premier Zoran Đinđić , in which case even today, after 8 years since the assassination, we only know the executors. Some threads link secret service to Russia where few important families fled after the war but still try to influence a situation in Serbia, while on the other hand they are suspected to protect those tycoons who wield the power in Serbia. Most probably war criminals wanted by Haag are also linked to some secret services high officials. In those circles there is consensus about one thing for sure: to keep Serbia far from NATO and EU. One might ask a question whether the President Boris Tadić is also protecting them or just simply he is not powerful enough to eliminate those forces, having in mind the consequence of the determined Đinđić’s policy. In any case it is obviously impossible to declare a concrete strategy about the defense strategy of the country. Playing by the nation wish, the distant approach towards NATO offers the similar instrument to Belgrade as it was the Non-aligned policy for forefathers. Tito was coruscating in the role of the head of Non-aligned Movement, while Milošević even had a braveness to lead a war against NATO.
From the other side Russia makes it unequivocal that Serbia shouldn’t become a member state of NATO. Russia has a big influence on Serbian internal policy thanks to strong support for Kosovo policy and through the control of Serbian energetic sector
Notwithstanding one of the most rational reasons could be also the problem of the restructuring the Serbian military industry, as traditionally most of the target markets are not NATO member states. In this case Serbia should implement NATO standards and to invest a lot to this sector. Due to the Serbian economical situation Serbia is not capable even to utilize its capacities on less developed markets. Unfortunately exactly the economical indicators disclose the latitude of Serbian situation. As long as Russia and China will not ensure similar benefits like the Western Alliance their attractiveness is just a pseudo – dilemma.
Professor Várady stresses that the EU doesn’t put NATO integration issue in the foreground in the context of Serbia’s accession process. He sees EU's understanding of Serbia’s relation to the NATO. But Serbia’s reserved approach towards the North-Atlantic Organization could be later considered as an obstacle, already in a much more advanced phase of the EU integration.
EU integration
While the NATO issue raises many doubts and questions, the European integration issue is more defined. Literally we can state it is even answered as Serbia has just delivered the responses to the Questionnaire to European Commission. During the incumbent government two significant changes happened. The first fact is the reconciliation between the President Boris Tadić led Democratic Party and the Serbian Socialist Party while the second one is establishing the Serbian Progress Party (SNS) by Tomislav Nikolić (the former Radical Party vice-president) - unambiguously committing to EU-oriented policy. By this step he has eliminated the extreme right wing from the political mainstream. Unfortunately these happenings have turned the country into a general corruption without well functioning control mechanisms. As the opposition is weak and divided there is no authentic and constructive critic. This situation is perfect for tycoons that try to keep their monopolies by destroying basic institutions of a transparent and democratic society. In this environment the Democratic Party took over the control over the most appreciable media like the National Television, NIN and Politika. Except of few tabloids financed by some of tycoons and secret services the opinion shaping media are now almost totally in hands of the government - with a clear pro-EU tone. It is important factor if we light out the fact that the same above mentioned organs have also provided “media support” to Premier Đinđić’s assassination. The biggest problem is after all the economical situation. In this phase of the integration the EU is most interested in the status and independence of regulatory bodies and naturally in the economical affairs. Due to the symbiosis of quasi-legal local businessmen and political elite, it generates a systemic corruption with a vertical projection to the whole society. Notwithstanding Professor Várady doesn’t consider Serbian internal policy so problematic and also has some doubts about statistics measuring the corruption level. According to his opinion now the EU has to concentrate on recovering from financial crisis and on working out a consensus over further enlargement. It is already sure that Croatia will join the Union, most probably in 2013, but the rest of the Western-Balkan states are still far from EU standards. Unofficially there are even some ideas to form a “waiting room” - similar solution like the alliance of North African states with such difference that Western - Balkan countries would have a secured future membership in EU. This conception would anticipate a long lasting commercial union of the potential Balkan candidate countries including Turkey as well. The only question is how the segmented Western Balkan region will cope with the better and better performing Turkish economy. Turkey recently plays serious role in the stabilization of the Balkan region, taking many diplomatic initiatives like for example pushing Serbian government to cut its support for the radical right politicians in Republika Srpska. Next to diplomatic activities we can soon expect the first Turkish investments in infrastructural projects in Serbia, while time to time we can hear about alleged intentions of Turkish Airlines to take over some of the regional air carriers. According to the Commercial Attache of the Turkish Embassy since the Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Serbia have came into force in September last year, Turkey doubled its export to Serbia, while Serbia still couldn’t reach similar results. However Professor Várady thinks that this is unrealistic to talk about Turkish domination in the region as the whole region has common experience with Turkish few hundred years presence and today even money cannot destroy walls of distrust. Despite the fact that he doesn’t see Serbia within EU borders in upcoming years, he is that EU is determined to invite the Balkan countries in. It is now time for the EU to revise its experiences with enlargements during last decades. Institutional reforms are required not only in candidate countries but they are also a challenge for the EU institutions. New rules have to be introduced in order to achieve a more effective organization within the Union of over 30 states.
Romania and Bulgaria had huge unresolved economical and institutional problems before accessing EU while among current new comers there are open border questions and national tensions. Will the EU be ever powerful enough to unset these threats inside EU, or we will have a chance to observe a desert encircled by EU borders however out of the Paradise? Most probably one day the whole region will be united, the only question is WHEN?
Kornél Nagy,
Belgrade – Gdansk
07.03.2011
Friday, April 8, 2011
Wednesday, November 24, 2010
Interview with Mr.Robert Vuga, the first man of Cargo 10 Alliance
...if the Corridor V is in a way limited, we have to see what we have on the Corridor X. Just one data to illustrate its capacity: in 1988 the traffic on Corridor X through the border station Dobova was 8 million tones, last year it was 1.9 million tones. It means the capacity is there. Then you search for a potential: from around 60 millions tones of cargo between Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia only 10% is bilateral, the rest is transit and the market share of the rail is around 15% in total. If we move further and we think about all the traffic between for example Munich and Istanbul, only 2-6% is the market share of rail transport. It means there is a huge potential to grow.
Why is it not growing?
If we see what the corridor IV is doing, we can see the number of trains connecting Munich and Istanbul, it makes 90% of the whole train traffic and corridor X is making only 10%. Then you have to ask what I am doing wrong if I have 900 km shorter corridor but still I have 10% of the traffic. There are two major reasons. One is the fact that through Corridor IV to reach Turkey you don't have to leave EU – there is only one border. If you go through Slovenia you have three borders plus Turkish one. That is first obstacle, because the customs processes are long on those borders (see CREAM project statistics below). The second reason is, and again we need to face facts and be critical toward ourselves, the organization of our production is not efficient enough.
We can see the potential, in theory we have capacities but actually only the Corridor X is where we can grow significantly even without making some major improvements in our infrastructure. We can organize traffic through Slovenian border even in 10 minutes but if on the other side of the border things do not function on the same manner then merely we have just not done our homework. So then we have two alternative options... the full text will be available soon in upcoming issue of Railway Market Magazine 04/2010
Why is it not growing?
If we see what the corridor IV is doing, we can see the number of trains connecting Munich and Istanbul, it makes 90% of the whole train traffic and corridor X is making only 10%. Then you have to ask what I am doing wrong if I have 900 km shorter corridor but still I have 10% of the traffic. There are two major reasons. One is the fact that through Corridor IV to reach Turkey you don't have to leave EU – there is only one border. If you go through Slovenia you have three borders plus Turkish one. That is first obstacle, because the customs processes are long on those borders (see CREAM project statistics below). The second reason is, and again we need to face facts and be critical toward ourselves, the organization of our production is not efficient enough.
We can see the potential, in theory we have capacities but actually only the Corridor X is where we can grow significantly even without making some major improvements in our infrastructure. We can organize traffic through Slovenian border even in 10 minutes but if on the other side of the border things do not function on the same manner then merely we have just not done our homework. So then we have two alternative options... the full text will be available soon in upcoming issue of Railway Market Magazine 04/2010
Aktualna sytuacja polityczna w Serbii - potencjalne scenariusze rozwoju wydarzeń w odniesieniu do Kosowa - 22.10.2010
Na początku października Prezydent Kosowa - Fatmir Sejdiu - złożył rezygnację z funkcji. Sejdiu oficjalnie zrezygnował z powodu decyzji Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, który orzekł, iż zaistniał konflikt interesów ze względu na jego jednoczesnej przywództwo w Demokratycznej Lidze Kosowa. Tak naprawdę trudno powiedzieć, co może być prawdziwym powodem jego decyzji i można tylko domyślać się prawdziwych przyczyn. Jedną z możliwych odpowiedzi jest to, że zrezygnował wiedząc, iż jako prezydent nie będzie miał żadnego wpływu na negocjacje z Belgradem. Z drugiej strony spekuluje się, że to tylko gra na zwłokę, mająca na celu opóźnienie faktycznych negocjacji z Serbią. W przypadku przeprowadzenia wcześniejszych wyborów parlamentarnych może minąć jeszcze 5-6 miesięcy zanim powróci się do debaty, podczas gdy UE i USA, które są gwarantami istnienia nowego niepodległego państwa nalegają, aby rozpocząć bezpośrednie rozmowy najszybciej jak to możliwe. Według niektórych opinii opublikowanych na serbskim portalu B92 Sejdiu i Tachi musieli ustąpić, by . . . sorry, but the content of study is not public
Port privatization in Montenegro - 24.02.2010
Mr. Milutin Mrkonjic the Serbian Minister of Infrastructure, distinctly claims – it is Serbian political interest to have a sea access, but he is convinced it as an economical interest as well for the Serbian industry. Despite the Serbian businessmen have not shown big interest to the Montenegrin Bar Port privatization and to Belgrade-Bar railway reconstruction plans, Miodrag Kostic the owner of MK Group supported by Serbian Premier Mirko Cvetkovic became the promoter of the project, taking the initiative to set up an appointment with the biggest industrial investors in the region and to stay behind the preparation of a technical feasibility study of the Belgrade-Bar railway reconstruction. The owner of East Point company, Mr. Zoran Drakulic states that he moves annually 1, 5 tones of grains and non-ferrous metal goods by the river of Danube to the Romanian Port Constanta. For him it is not rentable to push cargo through Montenegro as the less than 500km route requires an average 13 hours to get to the port, while he has a cheaper and faster arrangement with Constanta Port shipping by the river corridor VII. Miroslav Miskovic as well as the US Steel jumped out after the first session as they see no economical interest in such a big investment, while there is no reliable cost-benefit analysis about the railway corridor. For the Serbian industry such an investment would be too big not to have a negative effect on the domestic market as it would require a huge relocation of assets, while in Serbia is the infrastructure also in a poor state. The Belgrade – Bar route is not listed among the European main corridors because it has no transit potential, henceforth the Montenegrin Government cannot count on European support by IPA founds, only for credits by better conditions in the process of deeper integration to EU structures. For Montenegro it is vital to connect to the main corridors across Belgrade to corridor X and VII as well as to the Belgrade Airport which is the biggest aero hub for passenger and cargo transfer in the region. Montenegro has no capacity to attract industry investors as there are few bigger, better equipped and technically on a higher level operating ports (see table 1.) in the Mediterranean sphere. The port is rather could be attractive for countries without a direct sea exit. According to the Serbian media alluding to the experts of the Belgrade Technical Faculty, 80% of the Suez crossing ships cannot embark into the Bar Port, while Mr. Andrija Radusinovic the director of Container and General Cargo Terminal of Bar Port denies this emphasizing that only the 40 biggest trans-ocean freighter above 12 thousand container load cannot dock in Bar. Anyway it is fact that the landing stage has no adequate depth, which is one of the first and most expensive positions on cost side. Without sinking the harbor pool we cannot speak seriously about connected transport investments, because most of the boat operators not willingly direct their ships to the dangerous dock.
In the same time Montecargo, the state owned railway cargo carrier is on sale as well as the Railway Infrastructure Company (Željeznička infrastruktura Crne Gore) . Italian investors led by their government agreed to finance in part the upgrade Study of the Belgrade – Bar railway line, which should be ready until the end of 2010 in a cooperation of Italferr and CIP Transport Institute. For Italian business is interesting an eventual connection of the South-Italian Bari Port with Bar and Belgrade to Timisoara as there are many Italian manufacturing companies producing in Western Romania. Mladjan Dinkic the Serbian Minister of Economy and Regional Development also insists to realize the project which would be undoubtedly a success also for the Fiat investment in Kragujevac. This would ensure the shortest route to supply the parts to the mill as well as to transport Fiat cars to Italy. However to see a rational context in the whole project we have to look out to the wider region. Next to Serbia there are yet few Central –European countries without a direct sea access. Austria, Czech & Slovakia, Hungary and Bosnia and Herzegovina also could benefit from a new logistic center. As it is written in the Serbian Foreign Investment Law (2002) and in part regulated by the Railway Law (2005) public assets and infrastructural objects are allowed to be given to concession or to construct in a BOT model. The same rules apply to Montenegrin legislation too.
There could be a synergy connecting Budapest by a state of art railway to Belgrade and to ensure commercial credits for Serbia and Montenegro for the reconstruction southern from Belgrade. The Belgrade railway junction is part of the Russian credit line devoted for the Serbian Railway. From Belgrade to the Croatian border Sid the double track lane is in the best state which is the axis of X corridor in the direction of Zagreb and Ljubljana. While the Branch B runs from Stara Pazova junction across Novi Sad to Budapest. This single rail track from Stara Pazova to Budapest is in a very bad state from both of the Hungarian and Serbian side. This rout leads through Vojvodina in one connecting the two biggest cities in Serbia, Belgrade and Novi Sad, while from Novi Sad through Senta – Horgos line to Szeged (HU) still exists the abandoned for long years not used railway road, which is already listed as one of the track of the planned double track Novi Sad Subotica/Szeged-Budapest route. In Hungary there are no international European routes which pass through Szeged. It makes one of the biggest cities in Hungary to a dead-end while in case of building a divided double track could reintegrate 2 regions, ensuring dual direction passenger traffic on both of the lines, among them connecting Budapest Ferihegy Airport with Belgrade Airport. Meantime the freight traffic between Belgrade and Budapest would be operated as on a standard double track platform. Between Budapest and Bar there are two car plants, opening a south stream alternative could involve other industries on the route, not to mention the potential of intermodal (RO-LA) and container transport.
According to Budapest based ITCB consulting, there is an increasing number of investors from Hungary who are launching businesses both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Montenegro. Montenegro after the Russian investors becomes more interesting also for entrepreneurs from surrounding countries. Buying the port would not only ensure terminals and stores for cargo transfer, but also would give a much wider opportunities to the development of connected transport industry and services, not mentioning the security effect for a developing economy without an own sea exit. Other fact is the general increase of the volume of cargo transport in upcoming years which solely generates grows in case of every port manager in the Adriatic and Black Sea region. As it is underlined in Serbia the State administration alone is not taking part in the tender, only a consortium led by the newly established BB Cargo. The big silent from Austria and other Central European countries however anticipates, that despite all the envisaged investments most probably the project barely becomes profitable or just simply it requires too big investment in a (post)crisis period. It is obvious that Western-Balkan region becomes the part of EU already not so long. Such an input anyway will effect to speed up complex infrastructural projects.
The Bar Port and the Belgrade-Bar Railway line.
The port was built under Tito`s governance to ensure for the Montenegro member Republic an important traffic point in order to lead there stable infrastructure. After the 1979 earthquake almost the whole harbor had to be rebuilt. In former Yugoslav republic it was the smallest cargo seaport and generally used to serve the Serbian export of car, steel and agricultural production. According to the call for public tender for the sale of 54.0527% shares of the company Container Terminal and General Cargo, concession would be awarded for the period of 30 years with the obligation of investing . Originally the deadline to submit application was 1. February, but it has been prolonged to 31.March.
In 1975 the Montenegrin and Serbian electrified single railway tracks (standard gauge,25 kV, 50 Hz AC) were joined near to Kolasin, ensuring an average 90km/h transport speed between the port and Yugoslavian capital city. Nowadays the average speed is under 45km/h due to the lack of maintenance and later upgrades. The 476km long route passes through a difficult mountainous landscape, numbering 254 tunnels and 435 bridges. Technical Study of Upgrade is in preparation. Not officially the whole line reconstruction is estimated on 350 million EUR.
BB Cargo
The Serbian Government in the end of 2009 established the BB Cargo limited liability company, registered for railway cargo transport. The central office is registered in one of the governmental buildings in Belgrade. The paid-in capital is 62.000 EUR. By the decision of the board of directors the capital could be increased and it is decided to take a part in the privatization of Montecargo and Container and General Cargo Terminal of Bar Port. The tender documentation has been paid in amount of 20.000EUR. On the base of media reports the government is allocated 500 million RSD to submit offer as a minority shareholder in a consortium with interested companies.
Table 1. (Cargo traffic in 2009, source: official web sites of the ports)
port cargo type (thousand/T) Constanta (RO) Thessaloniki (GR) Rijeka (HR) Koper (SLO) Bar (MNE)**
general cargo 20.723 3.530 2.650 4.901 1.031
dry bulk cargo 10.418 3.427 3.377 5.575 738
liquid bulk cargo 10.873 8.006 6.364 2.667 452
total 42.014 14.963 12.391* 13.143 2.220*
* 2008 dates
** source: NIN
In the same time Montecargo, the state owned railway cargo carrier is on sale as well as the Railway Infrastructure Company (Željeznička infrastruktura Crne Gore) . Italian investors led by their government agreed to finance in part the upgrade Study of the Belgrade – Bar railway line, which should be ready until the end of 2010 in a cooperation of Italferr and CIP Transport Institute. For Italian business is interesting an eventual connection of the South-Italian Bari Port with Bar and Belgrade to Timisoara as there are many Italian manufacturing companies producing in Western Romania. Mladjan Dinkic the Serbian Minister of Economy and Regional Development also insists to realize the project which would be undoubtedly a success also for the Fiat investment in Kragujevac. This would ensure the shortest route to supply the parts to the mill as well as to transport Fiat cars to Italy. However to see a rational context in the whole project we have to look out to the wider region. Next to Serbia there are yet few Central –European countries without a direct sea access. Austria, Czech & Slovakia, Hungary and Bosnia and Herzegovina also could benefit from a new logistic center. As it is written in the Serbian Foreign Investment Law (2002) and in part regulated by the Railway Law (2005) public assets and infrastructural objects are allowed to be given to concession or to construct in a BOT model. The same rules apply to Montenegrin legislation too.
There could be a synergy connecting Budapest by a state of art railway to Belgrade and to ensure commercial credits for Serbia and Montenegro for the reconstruction southern from Belgrade. The Belgrade railway junction is part of the Russian credit line devoted for the Serbian Railway. From Belgrade to the Croatian border Sid the double track lane is in the best state which is the axis of X corridor in the direction of Zagreb and Ljubljana. While the Branch B runs from Stara Pazova junction across Novi Sad to Budapest. This single rail track from Stara Pazova to Budapest is in a very bad state from both of the Hungarian and Serbian side. This rout leads through Vojvodina in one connecting the two biggest cities in Serbia, Belgrade and Novi Sad, while from Novi Sad through Senta – Horgos line to Szeged (HU) still exists the abandoned for long years not used railway road, which is already listed as one of the track of the planned double track Novi Sad Subotica/Szeged-Budapest route. In Hungary there are no international European routes which pass through Szeged. It makes one of the biggest cities in Hungary to a dead-end while in case of building a divided double track could reintegrate 2 regions, ensuring dual direction passenger traffic on both of the lines, among them connecting Budapest Ferihegy Airport with Belgrade Airport. Meantime the freight traffic between Belgrade and Budapest would be operated as on a standard double track platform. Between Budapest and Bar there are two car plants, opening a south stream alternative could involve other industries on the route, not to mention the potential of intermodal (RO-LA) and container transport.
According to Budapest based ITCB consulting, there is an increasing number of investors from Hungary who are launching businesses both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Montenegro. Montenegro after the Russian investors becomes more interesting also for entrepreneurs from surrounding countries. Buying the port would not only ensure terminals and stores for cargo transfer, but also would give a much wider opportunities to the development of connected transport industry and services, not mentioning the security effect for a developing economy without an own sea exit. Other fact is the general increase of the volume of cargo transport in upcoming years which solely generates grows in case of every port manager in the Adriatic and Black Sea region. As it is underlined in Serbia the State administration alone is not taking part in the tender, only a consortium led by the newly established BB Cargo. The big silent from Austria and other Central European countries however anticipates, that despite all the envisaged investments most probably the project barely becomes profitable or just simply it requires too big investment in a (post)crisis period. It is obvious that Western-Balkan region becomes the part of EU already not so long. Such an input anyway will effect to speed up complex infrastructural projects.
The Bar Port and the Belgrade-Bar Railway line.
The port was built under Tito`s governance to ensure for the Montenegro member Republic an important traffic point in order to lead there stable infrastructure. After the 1979 earthquake almost the whole harbor had to be rebuilt. In former Yugoslav republic it was the smallest cargo seaport and generally used to serve the Serbian export of car, steel and agricultural production. According to the call for public tender for the sale of 54.0527% shares of the company Container Terminal and General Cargo, concession would be awarded for the period of 30 years with the obligation of investing . Originally the deadline to submit application was 1. February, but it has been prolonged to 31.March.
In 1975 the Montenegrin and Serbian electrified single railway tracks (standard gauge,25 kV, 50 Hz AC) were joined near to Kolasin, ensuring an average 90km/h transport speed between the port and Yugoslavian capital city. Nowadays the average speed is under 45km/h due to the lack of maintenance and later upgrades. The 476km long route passes through a difficult mountainous landscape, numbering 254 tunnels and 435 bridges. Technical Study of Upgrade is in preparation. Not officially the whole line reconstruction is estimated on 350 million EUR.
BB Cargo
The Serbian Government in the end of 2009 established the BB Cargo limited liability company, registered for railway cargo transport. The central office is registered in one of the governmental buildings in Belgrade. The paid-in capital is 62.000 EUR. By the decision of the board of directors the capital could be increased and it is decided to take a part in the privatization of Montecargo and Container and General Cargo Terminal of Bar Port. The tender documentation has been paid in amount of 20.000EUR. On the base of media reports the government is allocated 500 million RSD to submit offer as a minority shareholder in a consortium with interested companies.
Table 1. (Cargo traffic in 2009, source: official web sites of the ports)
port cargo type (thousand/T) Constanta (RO) Thessaloniki (GR) Rijeka (HR) Koper (SLO) Bar (MNE)**
general cargo 20.723 3.530 2.650 4.901 1.031
dry bulk cargo 10.418 3.427 3.377 5.575 738
liquid bulk cargo 10.873 8.006 6.364 2.667 452
total 42.014 14.963 12.391* 13.143 2.220*
* 2008 dates
** source: NIN
Wednesday, February 17, 2010
Оsovina Beograd-Zagreb tj. uticaj eventualnog pomirenja Beograda i Zagreba na evropske integracije Zapadno Balkanskog prostora
Naravno sve to što stoji u naslovu i podnaslovu danas je samo teorija. Neki bi rekli da je čak naivna, idealistička ili jednostavno utopijska. Ipak posle 20 godina nezavisnog života dve najvažnije prestonice u regionu neke stvari treba sagledati iz različitih perspektiva. Ima pozitivnih pomaka i sa jedne i sa druge strane Dunava. Neću da idealizujem prilike jer su svima jasne činjenice koje otežavaju današnje odnose na relaciji ZG-BG. Ipak sada ćemo analizirati onu tačku koja nam može poslužiti kao ishodište u pravcu izgradnje dobrosusedskih odnosa i čak više od toga.
Okolnosti još nisu sazrele do tog nivoa, ali prioritet treba da bude na zajedničkom suočavanju istorije. Opšte je poznato da je i Nemačkoj i Francuskoj za ovakav poduhvat bilo potrebno više dekada, međutim mi nemamo toliko vremena. To je naš test, kojim dokazujemo koliko smo hrabri i sposobni da gledajući u istorijsko ogledalo - učimo i priznamo svoje greške, koje su u naše ime učinili naši izabrani i neizabrani vladari. Samo delovanje jedne mešovite stručne komisije na ovom planu dalo bi rezultate, bez očekivanja brzih rezultata.
Nije sporno da procvat Yugo-sfere zapravo spada u period zajedničkog života svih balkansko-slovenskih naroda. Nije to nikakav sentimentalizam, nego se radi o racionalno izgrađenom tržištu, koje osim energetskih resursa nije bilo upućeno na uvoz industrijskih proizvoda. Sad i nije važno koliko je to u praksi bilo efikasno. Danas Evropa ide putem kojim je nekad i Jugoslavija hodala. Federalizacija ali s umerenom centralizacijom. Kad napustimo Horgoš, više nema granice do Lisabona, Gdanjska, ali da bi stigli danas u Ljubljanu iz Beograda pređemo minimum dve granice. Izgleda da se sve okrenulo naopačke. U ovoj formi nije interesantna ni Hrvatska, ni Srbija, Crna Gora, kamoli Bosna i Hercegovina. Ako se ponovo ne integriše južno slovenski region, kolektivno će gubiti korak sa civilizovanim svetom, čak i sa Rumunijom i Bugarskom. Zašto? Zato što na primer Rumunija nudi tržište od 22 miliona stanovnika a mi jedva 7,5 sami u Srbiji, ne računajući Kosovo. Bez krupnih infrastrukturnih projekata i bez jasne strategije za olakšavanje komunikacije ne samo između ljudi, nego i kapitala i svih dobara, nema napretka. Da bismo privukli krupne investicije moramo da udružimo naše resurse (ekonomske, ljudske) i da zajedno lobiramo ne samo u EU nego čak i na svetskoj skali. Ozbiljni kapital nije zainteresovan za rasparčano, različito pravno regulisano područje sa mini prestonicama bez ikakvog kosmopolitskog duha. Svima na balkanskom području je u interesu da privučemo kapital i zato umesto 7,5 miliona treba da nudimo približno toliko koliko nudi Rumunija. Niko nije zagovornik zajedničke države jugoslovenskih naroda, ali je Evropska perspektiva neminovna. Sada posle dve dekade nezavisnog egzistiranja na osnovu ekenomsko-političkih pokazatelja jasno je koja republika je koliko doprinela zajedničkoj državi ali je u Srbiji i dalje imperativ kritikovati Ustav iz 1974. godine bez obzira na političko i ideološko opredeljenje. Pomenuti ustav, je dao šire ovlašćenje svim federalnim jedinicama i definisao autonomije dveju pokrajina u Srbiji, koje bi danas apsolutno bile u skladu sa politikom EU koja radi na regionalizaciji. Imamo više regija, više političko-administrativnih zajednica, ali govorimo isti jezik. Ako nema jezičkih barijera, zašto gradimo administrativne prepreke, koje sabotiraju slobodno kretanje ljudi i kapitala? Zato inicijativa leži na strani Beograda i Zagreba. Obe prestonice su odgovorne za stvaranje atraktivnog zapadno balkanskog regiona, koji bi privukao slobodno privređivanje ne samo u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj već i između ostalih zemalja regiona.
Ne trebaju nam glasne i prazne izjave o nekom pomirenju ili strategijskom savezništvu. To će uraditi privrednici u tišini, ukoliko dobiju prostor i uslove, bez obzira da li oni investiraju u Mostaru, Požegi ili u Baru. Za to vreme najradikalnije nastrojeni slojevi lepo rade po fabrikama ili na građevini i nacionalizam polako gubi svoj poligon smanjujući teren destruktivnog delovanja.
Nakon inauguracije novog hrvatskog predsednika, predsednici Tadić i Josipović trebalo bi zajedno da sednu za sto. Neće to biti laki razgovori, teško je nasledstvo są obe strane ali kad-tad o ovome se ipak mora razgovarati! Da, postoje rane, žrtve, mržnja i razni zahtevi političkog i privrednog karaktera. Ali treba jasno definisati šta je zadatak diplomatije i šta je uloga istorije kao discipline? Diplomatija treba da se usredsredi na aktuelno delovanje po potrebi interesa starategije zemlje i na dobrobit svih građana. Da reši otvorena pitanja, vlasništvo nad stanovima i imanjima izbeglih lica iz Hrvatske istovremeno i ratnu odštetu od Srbije za razorene gradove i patnje prouzrokovano oružanom intervencijom po nalogu tadašnje beogradske administracije. Sve sporne slučajeve dati na nezavisnu međunarodnu arbitražu i neka se MOL i Gasprom spore oko toga kome šta pripada.
Ceo proces koji se odvija na tlu evropskog kontinenta odigrao se i na prostoru nekadašnje Jugoslavije. Umesto ekonomije, kod nas je ideologija igrala ulogu kolektivne hipnoze. Na zapadu blagostanje, a na jugu samoupravljanje u duhu bratsva i jedinstva. Samo što je Balkan ostao Balkan i u jednom momentu je jedna generacija političke elite nad Savom, u American Psycho duhu, došla do zaključka da će im karta nacionalizma obezbediti bezgraničnu vlast. Najgore je što su i sami poverovali u to. Pošto su prestonice nikle kao pečurke po kišu, balkanski prostor se nakon nekoliko vekova turske okupacije i raspada Jugoslavije, ponovo nalazi u raskomadanom stanju ali sada bez staralaca Austrije. Nacionalne države i razne krajine doživele su neviđenu euforiju nacionalizma tokom ludila devedesetih na čelu sa svemoćnim vladarima i bosovima podzemlja. Na žalost još uvek postoje teritorije koje čekaju na dalja rascepljenja, ali grad bez građanstva - intelektualne elite, ostaje provincija bez obzira gde je palata dona i njegove vlade. Provincija je osuđena na propast u sferi civilizovane politike, gubivši politički značaj i uticaj na promovisanje i odbrane svojih interesa. Jedino joj ostaje da se buni, i bolje joj je da to čini pre nego što razvoj događaja dođe do određene tačke. Postoje dve prestonice od kojih barem jedna uvek ima razumevanja ili ključ za rešenje problema.
Uticaj odnosa moćnog savezništva Zagreba i Beograda na razvoj i evropsku integraciju ostalih balkanskih zemalja.
Srbija mora da počinje da vodi treznu politiku prema Kosovu. Šta to znači? Ne znači naravno priznanje, ali nikako ne sme da vodi do samoizolacije. Beograd treba da obezbedi srpskoj privredi prodor na zasad izolovano tržište Kosova čak i u saradnji sa drugim firmama bez obzira da li su domaće ili strane. Pregovarački potencijal leži u činjenici da su Beograd i Zagreb nezaobilazni pravac do kontinentalne Evrope. Ovo zahteva mudru politiku, kako pregovarački potencijal ne bi postao ucenjivački kapital i da sve ponovo krene naopako... Ako se izgrade čvrsti temelji tržišne ekonomije i na uticaj EU makar samo u Hrvatskoj i Srbiji policija, pravosuđe i tajne službe počinju da sarađuju to već pruža garanciju stabilnosti ne samo za dve pomenute zemlje nego za ceo Balkan. Svaki narod balkana mora da bude svestan da međusobno neprijateljstvo slabi ceo region, koji već ionako dosta zaostaje za Unijom. Ne možemo i nakon sto godina samo da krivimo vekovne turske okupacije kada mi ni u sadašnjosti ne smemo da preuzmemo inicijativu koji se čini protivrečno isključivo zbog pogrešne politike poslednje dve dekade. Pravo je vreme da proverimo dokle stežu ruke dva najmoćnija predsednika i da li imaju snage i hrabrosti da se iskreno rukuju.
Danas izgovoriti da nam je Jugoslavija potrebna jednako je izdaji, i to je tako u bilo kojoj nekadašnjoj republici. Svi su u hipnozi, nacionalne vođe koje se teško odriču najjeftinijih političkih poena za cenu zaostalosti i opšteg raspadanja društva. To nije u interesu nijednoj nezavisnoj republici već samo užoj političkoj eliti. Više hramova i zvučnih govora ne rešavaju naše probleme. Ne trebaju nam referendumi i opšte narodni plebisciti. Potrebna je samo vizija i da neko radi na tome kao što je to činio pokojni premijer Zoran Đinđić.
Nema razvoja bez infrastrukture i to je aksioma ne samo sociologije nego i privrede. Brza pruga na trouglu Beograd-Ljubljana-Budimpešta-Beograd stvorila bi ambijent da se život ponovo vratio u region. Takav sistem saobraćaja bi dao puls i ostalim novonastalim prestonicama koje bi kvalitetnim priključenjem na spomenutu liniju mogle da se približe Evropi. Nije slučajnost da EU tretira barsku prugu kao unutrašnju politiku "sestre dvije Srbije i Crne Gore" i zato Evropa nikad neće dati rang evropskog koridora za trasu od Temišvara do Bara. Zato je neminovna izrada plana balkanskih saobraćajnih koridora prema interesima tržišta u nekadašnjem jugoslovenskom prostoru. Priključenjem Evropskoj Uniji bez velikih promišljenih projekata sve veći problem izaziva potrošiti i povući sredstava koje EU predviđa za finansiranje razvojnih projekata. Svima je jasno da Priština, Podgorica i Skopje prirodno gravitiraju ka Beogradu. Jednostavno tako je izgrađena infrastruktura za vreme Titove Jugoslavije i bez komunikacije oni su samo provincije koji nemaju adekvatan pristup ostalim evropskim gradovima. Opšte je poznato da aerodromi na ovim prostorima nisu predviđeni za širu masu i ako čekamo da oni sami to postanu, znači da čekamo da svi postanemo gastarbajteri.
Potrebno još mnogo vremena da bi se politika i privreda usmerile u opisanom pravcu. Neće to biti brz proces, ali ipak prilika je data u vidu dva predsednika, Hrvatske i Srbije da bi utemeljili saradnju dve zemlje na čvrstim osnovama. Nakon 15 godina po okončanju modernih balkanskih ratova, vreme ja da se dogovore Beograd i Zagreb i da pokažu primer svim ostalim narodima Balkana. Kada to shvati većina građana na ovim prostorima tek tada možemo reći, da, i mi smo deo Evrope. Moramo biti spremni za promene, jer nam Evropa sama neće kucati na vrata.
Okolnosti još nisu sazrele do tog nivoa, ali prioritet treba da bude na zajedničkom suočavanju istorije. Opšte je poznato da je i Nemačkoj i Francuskoj za ovakav poduhvat bilo potrebno više dekada, međutim mi nemamo toliko vremena. To je naš test, kojim dokazujemo koliko smo hrabri i sposobni da gledajući u istorijsko ogledalo - učimo i priznamo svoje greške, koje su u naše ime učinili naši izabrani i neizabrani vladari. Samo delovanje jedne mešovite stručne komisije na ovom planu dalo bi rezultate, bez očekivanja brzih rezultata.
Nije sporno da procvat Yugo-sfere zapravo spada u period zajedničkog života svih balkansko-slovenskih naroda. Nije to nikakav sentimentalizam, nego se radi o racionalno izgrađenom tržištu, koje osim energetskih resursa nije bilo upućeno na uvoz industrijskih proizvoda. Sad i nije važno koliko je to u praksi bilo efikasno. Danas Evropa ide putem kojim je nekad i Jugoslavija hodala. Federalizacija ali s umerenom centralizacijom. Kad napustimo Horgoš, više nema granice do Lisabona, Gdanjska, ali da bi stigli danas u Ljubljanu iz Beograda pređemo minimum dve granice. Izgleda da se sve okrenulo naopačke. U ovoj formi nije interesantna ni Hrvatska, ni Srbija, Crna Gora, kamoli Bosna i Hercegovina. Ako se ponovo ne integriše južno slovenski region, kolektivno će gubiti korak sa civilizovanim svetom, čak i sa Rumunijom i Bugarskom. Zašto? Zato što na primer Rumunija nudi tržište od 22 miliona stanovnika a mi jedva 7,5 sami u Srbiji, ne računajući Kosovo. Bez krupnih infrastrukturnih projekata i bez jasne strategije za olakšavanje komunikacije ne samo između ljudi, nego i kapitala i svih dobara, nema napretka. Da bismo privukli krupne investicije moramo da udružimo naše resurse (ekonomske, ljudske) i da zajedno lobiramo ne samo u EU nego čak i na svetskoj skali. Ozbiljni kapital nije zainteresovan za rasparčano, različito pravno regulisano područje sa mini prestonicama bez ikakvog kosmopolitskog duha. Svima na balkanskom području je u interesu da privučemo kapital i zato umesto 7,5 miliona treba da nudimo približno toliko koliko nudi Rumunija. Niko nije zagovornik zajedničke države jugoslovenskih naroda, ali je Evropska perspektiva neminovna. Sada posle dve dekade nezavisnog egzistiranja na osnovu ekenomsko-političkih pokazatelja jasno je koja republika je koliko doprinela zajedničkoj državi ali je u Srbiji i dalje imperativ kritikovati Ustav iz 1974. godine bez obzira na političko i ideološko opredeljenje. Pomenuti ustav, je dao šire ovlašćenje svim federalnim jedinicama i definisao autonomije dveju pokrajina u Srbiji, koje bi danas apsolutno bile u skladu sa politikom EU koja radi na regionalizaciji. Imamo više regija, više političko-administrativnih zajednica, ali govorimo isti jezik. Ako nema jezičkih barijera, zašto gradimo administrativne prepreke, koje sabotiraju slobodno kretanje ljudi i kapitala? Zato inicijativa leži na strani Beograda i Zagreba. Obe prestonice su odgovorne za stvaranje atraktivnog zapadno balkanskog regiona, koji bi privukao slobodno privređivanje ne samo u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj već i između ostalih zemalja regiona.
Ne trebaju nam glasne i prazne izjave o nekom pomirenju ili strategijskom savezništvu. To će uraditi privrednici u tišini, ukoliko dobiju prostor i uslove, bez obzira da li oni investiraju u Mostaru, Požegi ili u Baru. Za to vreme najradikalnije nastrojeni slojevi lepo rade po fabrikama ili na građevini i nacionalizam polako gubi svoj poligon smanjujući teren destruktivnog delovanja.
Nakon inauguracije novog hrvatskog predsednika, predsednici Tadić i Josipović trebalo bi zajedno da sednu za sto. Neće to biti laki razgovori, teško je nasledstvo są obe strane ali kad-tad o ovome se ipak mora razgovarati! Da, postoje rane, žrtve, mržnja i razni zahtevi političkog i privrednog karaktera. Ali treba jasno definisati šta je zadatak diplomatije i šta je uloga istorije kao discipline? Diplomatija treba da se usredsredi na aktuelno delovanje po potrebi interesa starategije zemlje i na dobrobit svih građana. Da reši otvorena pitanja, vlasništvo nad stanovima i imanjima izbeglih lica iz Hrvatske istovremeno i ratnu odštetu od Srbije za razorene gradove i patnje prouzrokovano oružanom intervencijom po nalogu tadašnje beogradske administracije. Sve sporne slučajeve dati na nezavisnu međunarodnu arbitražu i neka se MOL i Gasprom spore oko toga kome šta pripada.
Ceo proces koji se odvija na tlu evropskog kontinenta odigrao se i na prostoru nekadašnje Jugoslavije. Umesto ekonomije, kod nas je ideologija igrala ulogu kolektivne hipnoze. Na zapadu blagostanje, a na jugu samoupravljanje u duhu bratsva i jedinstva. Samo što je Balkan ostao Balkan i u jednom momentu je jedna generacija političke elite nad Savom, u American Psycho duhu, došla do zaključka da će im karta nacionalizma obezbediti bezgraničnu vlast. Najgore je što su i sami poverovali u to. Pošto su prestonice nikle kao pečurke po kišu, balkanski prostor se nakon nekoliko vekova turske okupacije i raspada Jugoslavije, ponovo nalazi u raskomadanom stanju ali sada bez staralaca Austrije. Nacionalne države i razne krajine doživele su neviđenu euforiju nacionalizma tokom ludila devedesetih na čelu sa svemoćnim vladarima i bosovima podzemlja. Na žalost još uvek postoje teritorije koje čekaju na dalja rascepljenja, ali grad bez građanstva - intelektualne elite, ostaje provincija bez obzira gde je palata dona i njegove vlade. Provincija je osuđena na propast u sferi civilizovane politike, gubivši politički značaj i uticaj na promovisanje i odbrane svojih interesa. Jedino joj ostaje da se buni, i bolje joj je da to čini pre nego što razvoj događaja dođe do određene tačke. Postoje dve prestonice od kojih barem jedna uvek ima razumevanja ili ključ za rešenje problema.
Uticaj odnosa moćnog savezništva Zagreba i Beograda na razvoj i evropsku integraciju ostalih balkanskih zemalja.
Srbija mora da počinje da vodi treznu politiku prema Kosovu. Šta to znači? Ne znači naravno priznanje, ali nikako ne sme da vodi do samoizolacije. Beograd treba da obezbedi srpskoj privredi prodor na zasad izolovano tržište Kosova čak i u saradnji sa drugim firmama bez obzira da li su domaće ili strane. Pregovarački potencijal leži u činjenici da su Beograd i Zagreb nezaobilazni pravac do kontinentalne Evrope. Ovo zahteva mudru politiku, kako pregovarački potencijal ne bi postao ucenjivački kapital i da sve ponovo krene naopako... Ako se izgrade čvrsti temelji tržišne ekonomije i na uticaj EU makar samo u Hrvatskoj i Srbiji policija, pravosuđe i tajne službe počinju da sarađuju to već pruža garanciju stabilnosti ne samo za dve pomenute zemlje nego za ceo Balkan. Svaki narod balkana mora da bude svestan da međusobno neprijateljstvo slabi ceo region, koji već ionako dosta zaostaje za Unijom. Ne možemo i nakon sto godina samo da krivimo vekovne turske okupacije kada mi ni u sadašnjosti ne smemo da preuzmemo inicijativu koji se čini protivrečno isključivo zbog pogrešne politike poslednje dve dekade. Pravo je vreme da proverimo dokle stežu ruke dva najmoćnija predsednika i da li imaju snage i hrabrosti da se iskreno rukuju.
Danas izgovoriti da nam je Jugoslavija potrebna jednako je izdaji, i to je tako u bilo kojoj nekadašnjoj republici. Svi su u hipnozi, nacionalne vođe koje se teško odriču najjeftinijih političkih poena za cenu zaostalosti i opšteg raspadanja društva. To nije u interesu nijednoj nezavisnoj republici već samo užoj političkoj eliti. Više hramova i zvučnih govora ne rešavaju naše probleme. Ne trebaju nam referendumi i opšte narodni plebisciti. Potrebna je samo vizija i da neko radi na tome kao što je to činio pokojni premijer Zoran Đinđić.
Nema razvoja bez infrastrukture i to je aksioma ne samo sociologije nego i privrede. Brza pruga na trouglu Beograd-Ljubljana-Budimpešta-Beograd stvorila bi ambijent da se život ponovo vratio u region. Takav sistem saobraćaja bi dao puls i ostalim novonastalim prestonicama koje bi kvalitetnim priključenjem na spomenutu liniju mogle da se približe Evropi. Nije slučajnost da EU tretira barsku prugu kao unutrašnju politiku "sestre dvije Srbije i Crne Gore" i zato Evropa nikad neće dati rang evropskog koridora za trasu od Temišvara do Bara. Zato je neminovna izrada plana balkanskih saobraćajnih koridora prema interesima tržišta u nekadašnjem jugoslovenskom prostoru. Priključenjem Evropskoj Uniji bez velikih promišljenih projekata sve veći problem izaziva potrošiti i povući sredstava koje EU predviđa za finansiranje razvojnih projekata. Svima je jasno da Priština, Podgorica i Skopje prirodno gravitiraju ka Beogradu. Jednostavno tako je izgrađena infrastruktura za vreme Titove Jugoslavije i bez komunikacije oni su samo provincije koji nemaju adekvatan pristup ostalim evropskim gradovima. Opšte je poznato da aerodromi na ovim prostorima nisu predviđeni za širu masu i ako čekamo da oni sami to postanu, znači da čekamo da svi postanemo gastarbajteri.
Potrebno još mnogo vremena da bi se politika i privreda usmerile u opisanom pravcu. Neće to biti brz proces, ali ipak prilika je data u vidu dva predsednika, Hrvatske i Srbije da bi utemeljili saradnju dve zemlje na čvrstim osnovama. Nakon 15 godina po okončanju modernih balkanskih ratova, vreme ja da se dogovore Beograd i Zagreb i da pokažu primer svim ostalim narodima Balkana. Kada to shvati većina građana na ovim prostorima tek tada možemo reći, da, i mi smo deo Evrope. Moramo biti spremni za promene, jer nam Evropa sama neće kucati na vrata.
Friday, February 5, 2010
A Budapest - Bár vasútvonal
Amíg a montenegrói kormány a szerb politikai vezetőséget igyekszik meggyőzni a bári kikötő koncesszióba vételéről, úgy tűnik Budapestet senkinek nem jut eszébe megemlíteni. Szinte olyan mintha azok sem tudnának róla ott a West-balkáni végeken, miről zajlik a biznisz déli szomszédaiknál. Szerbiában a külföldi befektetésekről szóló törvény lehetővé teszi a magán tőke részvételét infrastruktúrális létesítmények kiépítésében, valamint a 2005-ben az uniós irányelvekkel összhangban elfogadott vasúti törvény szintén engedélyezi egyes vasútvonalak koncesszióba adását. Budapest nemzetközivé téve Szegedet, egy Cegléd-Kiskundorozsma-Horgos- Újvidék vonallal a tiszamentén, Európához csatolhatná Újvidéken keresztül tovább a Sabac- Valjevo vonalon déli irányban, a bári kikötőt, miközben a kikötőn keresztül közvetlen kijárata nyílna az adriai tengerre. Az említett felvetés egyébként a montenegrói bári kikötő koncesszióba adásáról meghírdetett nyilvános pályázat kapcsán merült fel. Belgrádban köztudott, erős a montenegrói lobbi. Ezért nem meglepő, hogy a gazdasági válsággal súlytott Szerbiában inkább hangos szavak, mint valós érdekek szólnak a 30 éves koncesszióba vételről. A szerb üzleti elit nem érdekelt, ők ui. leginkább a fiumei, szaloniki és konstancai kikötőn keresztül szállítanak. Habár a vajdasági MK holding tulajdonosa Miodrak Kostic vállalta a "kormánymegbízást" a tárgyalások vezetésére és az üzleti körök összehívására, másik oldalról azonban jól illusztrálja a helyzetet Zoran Drakulic az East Point vállalat tulajdonosa, aki 3-szor olcsóbban hajózza Konstancába szállítmányát a Dunán keresztül saját flottájával. Állítása és szakértők egybehangzó véleménye szerint is a vasút revitalizációja és a kikötő alkalmassá tétele a szuezi-csatornán áthaladó nemzetközi hajók fogadására, a szerb gazdaságból kivonhatatlan és kölcsönözhetetlen tőkét követelne, tehát érdemi lépésre nem igen számíthatunk. Szerbia azonban következetesen, összhangban a hivatalos nyilatkozatokkal, eddig egyedüli érdeklődőként vette meg a december elején meghirdetett tender 20 ezer eurós pályázati dokumentációját. Az érem másik oldala, hogy egyszerűen külső források bevonása nélkül még mindig kérdéses a X. kooridor hátramaradt, belgrádi (fél)körgyűrűnek, valamint a Nis-Dimitrovgrad és Újvidék-Horgos félpályásszakaszok belátható időn belüli befejezésének. Ebben az esetben már érdemtelen bármilyen kalkulációkba kezdeni a vasúti korridor interoperálissá tételéről. A szerb közvélemény egyébként már nem igen fogékony a különböző "történelmi" és "stratégiai' megvalósíthatatlan kormányzati tervekre. Főleg nem akkor, amikor a Hágai Nemzetközi Bíróság a koszovói függetlenség legalitásáról hoz hamarosan nem kötelező érvényű bírósági véleményt, mindeközben a sokáig szövetségesnek hitt Montenegró arcátlanul tárgyal a koszovói albánokkal diplomáciai kapcsolat létesítéséről. Jogosan vetődik fel sokakban a kérdés mint pl. a B92 információs portál hozzászólásaiban, miért kell Szerbiának a saját létfontosságú projektek rovására újra a feketehegyi állam finanszírozását magára vállalnia, mint ahogy azt tette már az 1979-es földerengés utáni újjáépítésben is, s mindezt a miniállamra hagyva annak 2006 ban történt békés kiválásával.
A már említett vasúti törvényt alkalmazva és a december 14-én kihirdetett vajdasági új alapokmány szerint, a Statútum biztosítja a vajdasági szervek illetékességét a területükön keresztülhaladó infrastruktúrális projektek döntésében. Már ez a tény magában sokkal olajozottabbá tehetné az esetleges tárgyalásokat Budapest és a tartományi vezetőség, azaz Újvidék között. Ahogy Újvidék közvetlen csatlakozást biztosítana nyugat szerbia számára, úgy magának a vajdaságiaknak is alternatívaként megjelenne a ferihegyi reptér a belgrádi Nikola Tesla mellett, mindez azok mellett az előnyök mellet, ami Budapest logisztikai fajsúlyát és tranzit szerepét növelné a Bári Kikötő megszerzésével.
Egyébként a projektnek vannak még feltételezett érdeklődői, mégpedig olasz befektetők részéről, akik Belgrádon keresztül Temesvárt kötnék össze az olaszországi Bari kikötőjével természetesen Báron keresztül. Ez azért fontos folyosó az olasz gazdaság számára, mert komoly ipari befektetéseik vannak Romániában, főleg Temesvár tágabb körzetében. Kétségtelen, azonban, hogy ahol a feszültségek még a miniszterelnököt is arcon ütik, ott stabil és megbízható befektetői körről sem igen beszélhetünk.
Budapest maga biztos nem képes egy ilyen megaprojektet véghez vinni, viszont hasznos lenne a régió tengertelen országainak bevonásával egy dél irányú GYSEV vasúti koncepción elgondolkodni. Figyelembe véve a mai gazdasági helyzetet Közép-Európában, nem beszélve a szlovák-magyar viszonyokról, nyilvánvaló a felvetés kissé utopisztikusnak hangozhat, viszont a magántőke mindig világnyelven beszél. Másrészt nem valószínű, hogy a tender első nekifutásra sikeresen végződik.
A már említett vasúti törvényt alkalmazva és a december 14-én kihirdetett vajdasági új alapokmány szerint, a Statútum biztosítja a vajdasági szervek illetékességét a területükön keresztülhaladó infrastruktúrális projektek döntésében. Már ez a tény magában sokkal olajozottabbá tehetné az esetleges tárgyalásokat Budapest és a tartományi vezetőség, azaz Újvidék között. Ahogy Újvidék közvetlen csatlakozást biztosítana nyugat szerbia számára, úgy magának a vajdaságiaknak is alternatívaként megjelenne a ferihegyi reptér a belgrádi Nikola Tesla mellett, mindez azok mellett az előnyök mellet, ami Budapest logisztikai fajsúlyát és tranzit szerepét növelné a Bári Kikötő megszerzésével.
Egyébként a projektnek vannak még feltételezett érdeklődői, mégpedig olasz befektetők részéről, akik Belgrádon keresztül Temesvárt kötnék össze az olaszországi Bari kikötőjével természetesen Báron keresztül. Ez azért fontos folyosó az olasz gazdaság számára, mert komoly ipari befektetéseik vannak Romániában, főleg Temesvár tágabb körzetében. Kétségtelen, azonban, hogy ahol a feszültségek még a miniszterelnököt is arcon ütik, ott stabil és megbízható befektetői körről sem igen beszélhetünk.
Budapest maga biztos nem képes egy ilyen megaprojektet véghez vinni, viszont hasznos lenne a régió tengertelen országainak bevonásával egy dél irányú GYSEV vasúti koncepción elgondolkodni. Figyelembe véve a mai gazdasági helyzetet Közép-Európában, nem beszélve a szlovák-magyar viszonyokról, nyilvánvaló a felvetés kissé utopisztikusnak hangozhat, viszont a magántőke mindig világnyelven beszél. Másrészt nem valószínű, hogy a tender első nekifutásra sikeresen végződik.
why do we pay 1,20 EUR for a metro ticket in Budapest?
Anybody who would try to answer the question given in a title above, but has not visited Budapest recently may have a train of thoughts like this: Budapest as the first city in continental Europe with an underground transport would develop its public transport on such a level that simply it offers some really high quality service. Well we have to disappoint those thinkers and simply explain the post-social reality: BKV (Budapest Public Transport Co.) is a perfect model of today`s Hungary, "the country of hypocrite parasites" as it is described by Mr. József Papp an economist from Corvinus University. A public organization with sufficient work force and without any constructive approach in the lines of decision makers, but with a strong nepotism, corruption and the primitive instincts, so much characteristic for immature democracies: to grab as much as it possible during a mandate because nobody knows who will take over your position tomorrow. Here is the democracy in which on free elections simply the governing horde of politicians can be changed with another hungry chinovniks, with the same attitude. Now we even did n`t mention that those manager`s competency and qualification are generally measured by their loyalty to the appointing structures. OK. I see I went a little too general so let`s turn back to the original question, why do we travel on a 20 years old Ikarus for the price of a cup of coffee?! The BKV`s tariff income (sold tickets) is 60 billion HUF, normative subsidies financed by the state is 32 billion HUF and capital`s municipality also contributes in recent years with an amount of 10 billion. All this money however is not enough to cover the costs and in each year there is a shortcoming of 30 billion. In this year the state government agreed to pay additional 28 billion as a special aid. All these numbers give a result of 60 billion earned money to 70 billion state subsidy!! By this mathematics a single ticket which you buy for 320HUF indeed costs 660HUF ~ 2,50EUR !! It is incredibly high amount. Now we can talk about costs that create these crazy numbers. Overgrown administration staff, over-payed management and recently the skeletons also started to fall out from the wardrobes: audits discovered lots of contracts for different consulting and law advise services provided by different offshore companies and law offices. Additionally just these days the police confiscated hundreds of bills for severance payments to former and still working management staff. Parasitism inside the system while external costs are burdened by extra high taxes and fees on salaries toward the state, and of course expensive debts, because banks are not willing to finance the company in such a chaotic condition. This lack of will means higher costs of credits even by 40% than it could be in a case of a transparent organization. Returning back to the state`s role: it becomes obvious that all the state subsidies smoothly flow back to the state because of the mentioned high salary fees. The net cost of salaries is on a level of 30 billion while the common charges give a sum of 32 billion, which is exactly equal with state subsidies. Why are the costs net salaries so high? Just read this post once again and instead of the word "BKV" use "state administration"!
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